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International Court of Justice

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Notice.

Not to be publicized until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

A ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en session publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jener Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

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I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministère Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1946.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

F. Seidl

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers

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(Page 1 of orig.)

Nr. 2

Reichsgesetzblatt

Part I 1939, No 210 Berlin 24 October 1939

Decree by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration in the occupied Polish territories.

of 12 October 1939

In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the occupied Polish territories I decree:

Par. 1

The areas which are occupied by German troops shall be under the jurisdiction of the Governor General for the occupied Polish territories, insofar as they are not included in the German Reich.

Par. 2

1.) I apoint Reich Minister Dr. FRANK as Governor General for the occupied Polish territories.

2.) I appoint Reich Minister Dr. SEYSS - INQUART as deputy to the Governor General.

Par.3

1.) The Governor General is directly responsible to me.
2.) All administrative branches are assigned to the Governor General.

Par. 4

The law valid up to now continues in force insofar as it does not interfere with the taking over of the administration by the German Reich.

Par. 5

1.) The Ministerrat for the Reich Defense, the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan and the Governor General can decree the fixation of laws.

2.) The decrees are made public in the "Official Gazette for the Occupied Polish Territories."

Par. 6

The chairman of the Council of Ministers for the Reich Defense and commissioner for the Four Year Plan, as well as the highest Reich authorities, can effect decrees which are necessary for the planning of German life

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and the economic areas, as well as the territories under the jurisdiction of the Governor General.

Par. 7

1.) The occupied territory shall bear the expense for the administration.

2.) The Governor General shall set up an Exonomic Plan. The Economic Plan shall require the approval of the Reich Finance Minister.

Par. 8.

1.) The Reich Minister of the Interior shall be the Central office for the occupied Polish territories.

2.) The legal and administrative documents necessary for the execution and completion of this decree shall be released by the Reich Minister of the Interior.

Par. 9

1.) This decree shall be in effect as soon and insofar as I have withdrawn the mission of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for the execution of the Military Administration.

2.) The authority to carry out executive power is subject to a special rule.

39

Berlin, 22 October 1943

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

signed: ADOLF HITLER

The Chairman of the Council Of Ministers for the Reich Defense and Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
signed: GOERING
General Field Marshal
The Reich Minister of the Interior
signed: FRICK
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
signed: HESS
The Chief, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
signed: KEITEL
The Supreme Commander of the Army
signed: v. BRAUCHITSCH
The Reich Foreign Minister
signed: v. RIBBENTROP
The Reich Minister of Finance
signed: Count SCHWERIN von KROSIGK
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
signed: Dr. LAMMERS

Fr. 3

Reichsgesetzblatt, Part. I, 1942, No. 51
Issued at Berlin, 15. May 1942.

Fuehrer's Decree

concerning Establishment of a State Secretariat for Security Affairs in the Government-General.

Dated 17. May 1942.

I.

(1) A State Secretariat for security affairs is to be established in the Government-General.

(2) The State Secretary for security affairs is the Senior SS- and police chief in the Government-General. His official designation is:

Senior SS- and Police Chief in the Government-General, State Secretary for Security Affairs.

(3) The jurisdiction of the State Secretary for security affairs is to be determined by the Governor General in agreement with the Reichs-Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German police.

II.

The State Secretary for security affairs is at the same time the Deputy of the Reichs-Fuehrer SS in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the strengthening of German nationality.

III.

(1) The State Secretary for security affairs is subordinated directly to the Governor General.

(2) The representation of the Governor General by the State Secretary for security affairs results from my decree of the 7th May 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 294) on the administration in the Government General.

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IV.

(1) The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German police is authorized to give the State Secretary for security affairs direct orders in the fields of security and the stronghening of German nationality,

(2) Before execution of directives received from the Reichs-Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German police, the State Secretary for security affairs will ascertain if the Governor General is in agreement therewith.

(3) In affairs which affect the general interests of the Reich beyond the Government General, before executing directives of the Governor General the State Secretary for security affairs will ascertain if the Reichs Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German police is in agreement therewith.

V.

In cases of disagreement between the Governor General and the Reichs-Fuehrer SS and Chief of the German police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

Fuehrer's Headquarters, 7 May 1942

The Fuehrer

A d o l f H i t l e r .

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. L a m m e r s.

(Page 5
of Orig.)

Reichsgesetzblatt 1942, Part I, No. 56

Issued at BERLIN, 27 May 1942

Decree by the Fuehrer concerning the appointment of officials and the discontinuance of an official status in sphere of activity of the Governor General of 20 May 1942.

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1. I delegate to the Governor General the execution of the rights to which I am entitled for appointing, pensioning and dismissing officials who belong to the Governor General's sphere of activity, so far as I have not declared a proviso to No. 1 of my decree of 10 July 1937 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 769). In the case of an official of the finance offices A 2 d to A 3 b, the Governor General has to exercise these authorities in concurrence with of the highest Reich officials in whose budget system the official is carried.

2. The Governor General may further delegate the authorities delegated to him through A particularely 1, with the approval of the Reich Ministers of the Interior and Finance.

3. I reserve the right of personal decisions in special cases as well as in respect to paragraphs 1 and 2, concerning officials.
The Governor General's sphere of activity does not, in the sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the sphere of the SS Reichsfuehrer and the Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and to the customs control.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 20 May 1942

THE FUEHRER

ADOLF HITLER

The Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. LAMMERS

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Copy of Document: 686 - PS (USA - 305)

Copy to RK 26272 B

Decree

of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor for the strengthening of German Nationality

Dated Oct 7th, 1939.

The consequences of Versailles have been removed in Europe. Now the Greater German Reich has the possibility to admit in its territory, Germans, who had hitherto to live abroad, and to resettle them, and to arrange the settlement of the groups of people within her sphere of interest in a way that there will be better distinction between them. I entrust the Reichsfuehrer SS with the execution of this task according to the following regulations:

I

The Reichsfuehrer SS has the obligation in accordance with my directives:

1. to bring back for final return into the Reich all German nationals and racial Germans in the foreign countries.
2. to climinate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the population which represent a danger to the Reich and German folk community
3. the forming of new German settlements by resettling and in particular by settling of the returning German citizens and racial Germans from abroad.

The Reichsfuehrer SS is authorized to take all necessary general and administrative measures for the execution of this obligation.

The Reichsfuehrer SS can assign certain living areas to the parts of the population in question in order to execute the tasks given to him in article 1 No. 2.

II.

In the occupied former Polish territories the Administration Chief of the East (Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost) carries out the tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS according to the latter's general orders. The Verwaltungschef Ober-Ost and the subordinated chiefs of administration of the military districts are responsible for the execution. Their measures have to be adjusted to the requir

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ments of the military leadership.

Persons who are furnished special orders in execution of this task, are not subject to military jurisdiction in that respect.

III.

The tasks assigned to the Reichsfuehrer SS, so far as the re-organization of German farmers is concerned will be executed by the Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agricalture following the general directives of the Reichsfuehrer

Otherwise the Reichsfuehrer SS will make use, within the territory of the German Reich, for the execution of his task of the existing authorities and institutions of the Reich, the states and the communities as well as all other public institutions and the existing settlement societies.

In case an agreement required by law and administrative organization cannot be reached about a measure to be taken, between the Reichsfuehrer SS and the competent higher Reichsauthority - in the operational territory of the Supreme Commander of Army - my decision has to be sought through the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

IV.

Negotiations with foreign governments and other authorities as well as with the racial Germans, as long as they are still abroad, will be conducted in cooperation with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (Reichsminister des Auswaertigen).

V.

If land is required for the settlement within Germany of returning German citizens and racial Germans, the law on providing land for purposes of the Army of March 29th, 1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 467) and its executive regulations will be applied to provide the necessary land. The tasks of the Reich agency for providing land (Reichsstelle fuer Landbeschaffung) will be taken over by the agency designated by the Reichsfuehrer SS.

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VI

The Reich Minister for Finance will provide the Reichsfuehrer SS with the necessary means for the execution of the measures.

Berlin 7 October 1939

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

signed: Adolf HITLER

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers

for the Defence of the Reich

signed: GOERING

Field-Marshal

The Reich Minister and the Chief of the

Reich Chancellery

signed: Dr. LAMMERS

The Chief of the High Command of the

Armed Forces

signed: KEITEL.

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Copy of Document 710-PS (USA - 509)

The Reich Marshal of the
Greater German Reich
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Chairman of the Ministerial Council
for National Defense

Berlin, 31 July 1941

To:

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service;
SS-Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH

Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at - through furtherance of emigration and evacuation, a solution of the Jewish problem, as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.

Wherever other governmental agencies are involved, these are to cooperate with you.

I charge you furthermore to send me, before long, an overall plan concerning the organizational, factual and material measures necessary for the accomplishment of the desired solution of the Jewish question.

signed: GOERING

135

Copy of document No. 647 - PS (USA - 135)

Pages 1,2,8

Top secret!

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

F.H.Qu., 13 March 1941

WPST/Div. L (IV/Qu)
44123/41 g.K. Top secret

5 copies
4 th copy

Subject: WFSt/Div. L (I) No. 33408/40
Top secret
18 December 40

Outlines for Directive No. 21 for special cases:

(Barbarossa case)

I' Operational area and executive power.

1.) In East Prussia and in the General-Government the OKW will put into effect al command-authorities and appointments in regard to supplies that are called for in an operational area within the Armed Forces, not later than four weeks before the beginning of operations.

The Army High Command will present the suggestion in ample time after its approval by Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

A declaration of East Prussia and the General Government to be operational area of the Army is not contemplated. However, on basis of the unpublished Fuehrer decree of 19 and 21 October 1939 the Commander in Chief of the Army is authorized to enact measures that [illegible] are necessary for the execution of his military missions and for the security of his troops. He can further transfer this authorization to the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Such decrees supersede all other obligations and directives by civilian offices.

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
t/ Signed – KEITEL

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(Page 11 of Orig.)

Zu. 5

Reichsgesetzblatt 1942, Part I, No. 40

published in Berlin, 21 April 1942.

Order for the Execution of the Fuehrer's Decree on the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment (Arbeitseinsatz of 27 March 1942.

In execution of the decree of the Fuehrer on a Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment of 21 March 1942 (RGBL, I Page 179 I order the following:

1) My labor commitment business groups (Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz) (circular decree of 22 October 1936/ St.M. Dev. 265) are herewith dissolved. Their duties (procurement and distribution of labor, regulation of working conditions) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment who is directly under me.

2) The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment will be responsible for regulating the working conditions (wage policy) of workers employed in Reich territory, in accordance with the requitements of labor commitment.

3) The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment is an agency (Organ) of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required or existing laws have to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.

4) The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Commitment will have at his disposal for the performance of his task the authority delegated to me by the Fuehrer for the issuance of instructions to the highest Reich authorities, their subordinated offices, as well as the offices of the party and its formations and affiliated organizations, to the Reich Protector, the Governor General, the military commanders and the chiefs of the civil administrations. Orders and directives of fundamental importance are to be submitted to me beforehand.

Berlin, 27 March 1942

The Commisioner for the Four Year Plan.

H0660 - 0014

1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, No. 40

published at Berlin, 21 Apr 1942.

Nr. 6

Decree by the Fuehrer, concerning a
Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of Labor
of 21 March 1942

In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited (erworben) abroad and of prisoners of war, should be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still incompletely utilized manpower in the Greater German Reich, including the Protectorate, and in the General Government and in the occupied territories, should be mobilized.

Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz SAUCKEL will carry out this task within the framework of the Four Year Plan, as Plenipotentiary General for the employment of manpower. In that capacity he will be directly responsible to the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan.

Section III (wages) and Section V (utilization of manpower) of the Reich Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will be placed at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the accomplishment of his task.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 21 March 1942

The Fuehrer
Adolf HITLER
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Chancellery
Dr. LAMMERS
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces
KEITEL

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Excerpt from USA - 206
1903 - PS

Decrees, Directives, Announcements Vol. II. (Verfuegungen/Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben"), Edited by the Party-Chancellory. Published by: Zentralverlag der NSDAP,Frz. Eher Gmbh. Munich - page 510.

Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the mobilization of labor (Arbeitseinsatz).

In the following the Fuehrers' decree on the extension of the authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz is made public:

" Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the Deputy General for the Arbeitsdienst of 30 September 1942.

I herewith authorize the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz Reichsstatthalter Fritz SAUCKEL to take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree referring to a Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March 1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 179) according to his own judgment in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorat, and in the General Government as well as in the occupied territories, measures which safeguard under all circumstances the regulated deployment of labor (geordneter Arbeitseinsatz) for the German war economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners (Beauftragte) with the bureau of the military and civilian administration. These are subordinated directly to the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz. In order to carry out their tasks, they are entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy.

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More detailed directives will be issued by the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 30 Sept. 1942

The Fuehrer

signed, Adolf HITLER

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

signed Dr. LAMMERS

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

signed KEITEL

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Copy of Document: 1526-PS (USA-178)

Copy III

Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr KUBIJOWYTSCH,

Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.

Cracow, February 1943.

To the

Governor General,

Reich Minister Dr. FRANK.

Your Excellency:

Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within the General Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary of State Dr. BUEHLER as far back as December 1942. In that letter I stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.

...

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Copy of Document: 1061-PS (USA-275)

Pages 3,4.

II.

.....It soon became clear, however, that not all dangers had been removed by this confining the Jews to one place. Security considerations required removing the Jews from the city of Warsaw altogether. The first large resettlement action took place in the period from 22 July to 3 October 1942. In this action 310,322 Jews were removed. In January 1943 a second resettlement action was carried out by which altogether 6,500 Jews were affected.

When the Reichsfuehrer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943 he ordered the SS and Police Leader for the District of Warsaw to transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises of military importance which were installed within the Ghetto including their personnel and machines. The execution of this transfer order proved to be very difficult, since the managers as well as the Jews resisted in every possible way. The SS and Police Leader thereupon decided to enferce the transfer of the enterprises in a large scale action which he intended to carry out in three days. The necessary preparations had been taken by my predecessor, who also had given the order to start the large scale action. I myself arrived in Warsaw on 17 April 1943 and took over the command of the action on 19 April 1943, 0600 hours, the action itself having started the same day at 0600 hours. .....

The SS and Police Commander
in the Warsaw District
signed STROOP
SS Brigadefuehrer and
Brig. Gen. of Police.

H0660 - 0020

Translation of Copy of Document: L - 18
(USA - 277)

Top Secret

The SS & Police Leader
in the District of Galicia

June 30th 1943
2 Copies
2 Copies
1st copy

Ref. 42/43 g.R.-Ch/Fr

Re: Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia

Concerning: Enclosed Report

Enclosure: 1 Report (executed in triplicate)
1 bound Copy

To

The Senior SS and Police Leader East
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Police
KRUEGER or deputy
CRACOW

Enclosed I am submitting the 1st copy of the Final Report on the Solution of the Jewish Question in the District of Galicia for your information.

(Signed) KATZMANN
SS Gruppenfuehrer and Lt. Gen
of Police.

PP. 4,5

After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers by providing them with goods in scarce supply etc., it was considered necessary to introduce really draconic measures. Unfortunately it had to be stated that the Germans employed in the district, especially so-called "Operational Firms" or the "ill-famed Trustees" carried on the most extravagant black market activities with Jews. Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages, but even paid money themselves. Moreover, the "organizing" of Jews for the benefit of their "employers" grew to so catastrophic extents that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most energetic manner fo the benefit of the German name.

Since the Administration was not in a position and showed itself too weak to maste this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply took over the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The Jewish Labor Agencies which were manned by hundreds of Jews,

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were dissolved. All certificates of labor given by firms or administrative offices were declared invalid, and the cards given to the Jews by the Labor Agencies were revalidated by the Police Offices by stamping them.

In the course of this action again thousands of Jews were caught who were in possession of forged certificates or who had obtained surreptitiously certificates of labor by all kinds of pretexts.

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Translation of Copy of Document: 2220-PS (USA-175)

The Reich Minister and Chief
of the Reich Chancellery

Berlin W 8, 17 April 1943
Vosstrasse 6
present Field Headquarters

RK. 318 D g III SECRET

To the

Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
Herr HIMMLER

Subject: Conditions in the General Government.

Very honored Reichsfuehrer:

In our conference of 27 March of this year, we had agreed that written memoranda should be worked out about conditions in the General Government, on which our intended, mutual report to the Fuehrer could be based.

The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenfuehrer KRUEGER was submitted to you immediately. Based on this material, I have had a report prepared which sums up the most important points of this material, subdivides them clearly and culminates in an exposition of the measures to be taken.

The report has been checked together with SS Obergruppenfuehrer KRUEGER and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it to you herewith.

A further discussion about the matter appears to me only necessary of you or Reichsleiter BORMANN have substained objections against the contents of the report. I ask you to inform me as soon as possible whether this is the case or not.

Heil Hitler!

Yours respectfully

t/ signed: Dr. LAMMERS

part of usa 175

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Copy to RK, 318 D g III

FQ, 12 April 1943

SECRET

Subject: Conditions in the General Government.

A. The Taks of the German Administration in the General Government.

The German administration in the General Government has to fulfil the following tasks:

1.) To increase agricultural production and seize as much of it as possible for the purpose of securing food for the German people, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work essential to the war effort and to carry off the rest for the armed forces and the homeland.

2.) to employ the manpower of the native population in the General Government itself only for war-essential purposes, and to place at the disposal of the homeland such manpower as is not needed for the purpose mentioned above.

3.) to consolidate German ways and characteristics (Volkstum) in the General Government everywhere and especially by means of settlements in the interior in the Eastern border areas as well as bringing together racial Germans (Volksdeutsche) who have been settled in other places, and thus safeguarding these border districts themselves.

4.) to safeguard the General Government as a transit area for supplies for the East Front.

5.) to obtain as many troops as possible from the native population for the military struggle against Bolshevism.

B. Wrong Ways Taken for the Fulfilment of these Tasks.

The German administration in the General Government has failed extensively with respect to the tasks listed under "A". Even if a relatively high percentage, namely over 90%, of the delivery quota of agricultural products for the armed forces and the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942, and if the labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied, still on the other hand, two things must be made clear: First, these accomplishments were achieved for the first time in the year 1942

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before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been delivered for the armed forces. Secondly,and above all, one had failed to create for the achievement of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational economic and political character which are indispensable, if such performances are not to lead to a shock to the entire situation from which chaotic conditions could eventually come about in every respect. This failure of the German administration can be explained for one thing by the system of the German administrative and governmental activity in the General Government as represented by the Governor General, and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all those questions which were decisive for conditions in the General Government.

I. <u>The Spirit of the German Administration in the General Government.</u>

From the beginning, it has been the endeavor of the Governor General to create a state organization out of the General Government which was to lead its own existence in complete independence of the Reich. The Governor General designates himself as a head of state (see his suit for divorce), and has received the Italian Count FOSSOMBRONE in his entourage as a sort of diplomatic representative of Italy. Numerous trips abroad of an official character were intended to give this recognized position of the Governor General a background abroad also...

II. <u>The Failure of Fundamental lines of Policy.</u>

1.) <u>The Economy</u>

The fulfilment of the tasks, described in "A"1), requires in the first place a correct economic structure, as well as a strict and clean official economic leadership, together with as complete an elimination as possible of clandestine trade and the black market. This is above all conditional upon the total seizure and public management of the harvest,

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the closing down of all trade enterprisss which are not war-essential, the concern for a clean management in war essential enterprises.

The German administration has by no means done justice to these requirements.

In the field of the food economy, a request for a delivery quota for the Reich and the Armed forces to the amount of 756,000 tons of bread grain in the summer of 1942 was needed in order to have an attempt made to draw up an inventory of food products and to carry out a census for this purpose which, however, had no satisfactory result. The seizure of the harvest did not even permit the full delivery of the quota for the Reich and the armed forces.....

3.) The Treatment of the Native Population

can only be led in the right direction on the basis of a clean and orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation permits that the native population be handled strictly and if necessary even sererely, on the one side, and on the other side that one may act generously with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction in the population by certain liberties, especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation, severity strengthen the resistance movement, and meeting the population half way only undermines the German reputation. The above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of encouraging of the individual cultural life of the Polish populatbn which in itself is already overshooting the goal, but which under the existing conditions, and not the least in connection with our military situation during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness and must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.

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4.) The Relationship of Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche) and the Polish-Ukrainian Population in the General Government.

The cases are numerous in which the German administration puts the requirements of the racial Germans (Volksdeutsche) in the General Government in the background in favor of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in the endeavor to win the latter over to us. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans settled somewhere else were not to be ~~allocated~~ / immediately as settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be employed as farm workers. Legal foundations for the expropriation of Polish property have not been created up until now. Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers has not been stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in the General Government, the sheltering of children of German citizenship from t territories which were threatened with bombing and of Stalingrad fighters ran into difficulties, while foreigners took convalescent vacations there and so on. The big plans for resettlement in the LUBLIN district for the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less frictio if the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Ways and Characteristics (Volkstum) had found the desirable cooperation and assistance of the administration. From the beginning attention had been paid to the necessary sparing of the Polish population in connection with this.

From the background of the above-mentioned conditions, all this could only lead to a further weakening of German reputation and to damage to German interests.

5.) The Security Situation.

The aims of the Polish resistance movement are to disturb the reconstruction of the German administration, to mislead the population in to thoughtless and violent actions, to prepare

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inward unrest, and when the time comes to organize a general revolutionar movement which is able to cut off our Eastern front from the supply lines. The leading class of the resistance movement, which has even come to the point of organizing of paramilitary formations, is almost exclusively composed of members of the Polish intelligentsia. A large part of the 50,000 former Polish officers, likewise lawyers, engineers, chemists, physicians, professors teachers, priests, landowners and business men make up the nucleus of the movement. A not inconsiderable part of them work "loyally" in the German administrative offices by orders from the resistance movement in order to gain good information in this manner, and to be able to find out weak places as starting points for their revolutionary work.

Under these conditions, precaution and reserve toward the old Polish intelligentsia is needed, and making agreements with it is wrong. The desire of the administration that police measures against the resistance movement should be coordinated with it in advance, is unfeasable under the above-mentioned conditions. Experience has shown that measures which have been discussed with the administration in advance did not remain secret to the resistance movement and were therefore unsuccessful.

While the Governor General in the beginning opposed the barracked police as a useless parade-ground unit, the cry for police has become now general. Their employment is also sought outside their proper field of duty in order thereby to close the loopholes which have opened up as a result of the failure of the general administration in several fields.

C.) The Consequences.

The administrative system, represented by the Governor General personally, and the actual failure of the general German administration in the most various fields of decisive importance, did not only shake the confidence and the

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will to work of the native population, but has also brought about the result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly disunited throughout their history, have come together in a united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which alone those achievements which the Reich requires from the General Government, and those aims which it must see realized in the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. The non-fulfilment of the tasks given to the general administration naturally had to lead, as happened, for example, in the field of the strengthening of German ways and characteristics (Volkstum) (compare B, II, 4), that other administrative bodies (Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Volkstum and the Police) took over these tasks. From this there developed manifold frictions and workings at cross purposes among the various German authorities which again could not be without detrimental consequences to the attitude of the native population and to the German reputation in the General Government. And so, all in all, the danger exists that the conditions in the General Government are heading toward a chaotic situation if a radical and fundamental change does not take place very soon.

3.) Measures in the Field of Political Leadership and Administration.

Besides the measures to be taken in the field of personnel, the most important prerequisite for the improvement contitions in the General Government is the steady pursuance of a clear fundamental line of policy, and an administration, which is organized accordingly and carried out in consciousness of the goal. What is important in this respect can be seen in a general way from what was mentioned in section "B". The basic problem of the administration is, therefore, a thorough reorganization in the field of economy. By that alone, can the foundation be created

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without which the solution of all other problems is impossible. However, if this foundation has been created, then the other problems no longer present unsurmountable difficulties. And thereby the starting point is also finally given for carrying out the task, which was designated in section "A" 5, but has not yet been attempted up to now, i.e. to win troops for the military struggle against Bolshevism from among the native population.

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The Governor General 19 June 1943

SECRET

My Fuehrer!

In the most violent battle of all times, for which the German people has assembled under your leadership in the battle for its rights of living, German soldiers have conquered vast European territories with their blood in a victorious advance which is uncomparable. In accordance with your order, these territories - differently from former wars - are to be employed immediately in the service of the continuation and victorious conclusion of the European fight for freedom. Through intensive efforts on the part of the civil administration in the General Government immediately after the victorious conclusion of the Polish campaign it has become possible to an increasing extent to deliver to the fighting Europe great contributions for the streng-

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thening of its freedom of food, to establish an armament industry in the General Government which can be extended, to channel millions of workers into the armament economy and other vital industries of the Reich and finally to organize the General Government completely into an assembly area, functioning without friction, through the construction of roads and railway installations. The achievements which have been made so far, confirm the success and the correctness of the measures which you have ordered.

The continuation of the war and the necessity to apply all plans for a longer duration of the use of these areas, raise the question in connection with the previously made experience, if by means of a change in the methods of treatment, accorded to foreign nations, still further intensification of the work of the occupied territories can be reached for the German interest.

The petition of the "United Polish Military Organizations of the Movement Niecz 1 Plug", which was sent to me on your order by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for my opinion, gives me

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the opportunity to take a fundamental stand in the question of the political treatment of the Polish people as follows:

1.) <u>The Political Face of the Polish People.</u>

The mass of the Polish people, in the course of its history, has only rarely and then only to a minor degree influenced its leadership. For the most part completely disinterested in the political questions of the day and not in the least educated under the influence of the Catholic church for accepting tolerance, it has left the guiding of its fate to the thin caste of masters who are living isolated from the people and organized in a castelike manner, and has followed a generally poor trade with most modest demands on life. The Polish caste of masters, its majority moved by selfish economic and political striving for power and filled with a overbearing idea of power, cared little to carry out a just order in the interior of the country. Because of this, it could never reach a political unity supported by the people. As the result of their overbearing foreign political imperialistic demands, the former

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Poland as well as the Polish state of 1918 was in conflict with almost all neighboring states and neighboring peoples.

Under these prerequisites, the striving of the Polish people for federal independence could not be rewarded with a lasting success. However, its political leadership has succeeded in disturbing the efforts attempted before the World War by Germany, Austria and Russia to integrate the Polish elements to their states. In this respect, the Poles in spite of their minority in number have even succeeded to gain mastery in an administrative respect in Austrian Galicia. Aside from the army and from certain important positions, they also provided in the parliamentary period almost all officials, civil servants and teachers. The Poles in this territority whose administration could resort to the rich tax incomes from the other Austrian provinces, only lacked a federal union with their racial brothers under Prussian and Russian rule. This favorable position of the Galician Poles doubtlessly resulted in

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a weakening of its federal striving for freedom. Even if occasionally in their press, the thought of the reconstruction of a free Old-Poland as an independant state was propagated, the active preparations for the embodiment of this wish was left to the minorities living under German and Russian rule. Even today, in view of this political development, the Galician Poles show a much less radical and active attitude in the fight between minorities than the Poles from the other parts of the General Government. They also are less susceptible to Bolshevist influences in all classes.

The Greater Polish state called to life after the World War, which thanks its existence to the one-sided foundation on faked documents about the national life in the parts used by it and to the will of the Western powers to keep Germany down, still did not correspond, in spite of the Western and Eastern borders achieved to the Great Polish plans of its political leaders, who have been previously characterized. Although the borders achieved in 1919, exceeded by far the Polish settlement area, these classes never gave up the dream of a Polish Empire from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In this respect they completely failed to recognize that

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already the state territory which had fallen into their lap has never been a limited or closed settlement area, but on the contrary, has been settled by considerable minorities from the circle of the neighboring nations.

The thin Polish governing class of leaders in the Polish state from 1918 to 1939 has already forfeited any demand for governorship in this area because of its sufficiently well-known behavior toward the minorities entrusted to its care. However, it had to fail further because of its internal policy which is mostly pointing toward an unlimited satisfaction of personal advantages, and because of the negligence toward the basic rights of the patient people entrusted to its leadership for a social and economic existence which makes life worthwhile. The German leadership in the territory, of the former Polish state, as far as it was not incorporated as ancient German settlement area into the limits of the Reich, concludes with this a historically necessary development at the end of which stands the exploration, pacification and the re-construction of a breeding ground of unrest in the East of Europe, disturbing the welfare of all of Europe, and not in the least also for the advantage of its inhabitants as task and goal. The execution of this task is a contribution impossible to ignore in its

importance for the New Order of Europe.

II. The Polish People under German Rule.

For the German administration, which started its activity after the establishment of the General Government at the end of October 1939, the task arose especially urgently in view of the above explanations, to exclude the former Polish class of leaders, which exercised a harmful influence for the country as a whole and for the European construction, and to bring them to an attitude and employment in accordance with the superior interests. All attempts for the introduction of the newly won area however had to result in a failure, if it did not succeed to bring the masses of the Polish workers and peasants out of the apathy, which had been tolerated and even furthered by their former leaders, and to stimulate them to a valuable constructive activity. It could be determined at first that a not inconsiderable part of the Polish farmers and workers hoped for an improvement of their living

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conditions from the German domination, and therefore welcomed the German activity at first. As a consequence of their political indifference, the mass of the Polish farmers and the greater part of the Polish workers could be guided without special difficulties because of sufficient food and suitable treatment, and they could be made of service to the German domination. The higher level, refuting the German domination a great deal within themselves, and the middle class, which is actually not very big, were and are on the other hand much more oriented politically. Despite their opposing attitude, the largest part of the Polish middle class and of the Polish higher level could still be influenced the first years of the existence of the General Government in such a manner that they put their working power at the service of German interests. The urge for self-survival was not the smallest factor which induced them to retain if not a loyal, at least a legal attitude. Although it has happened that small Polish groups disregarding their personal fate, took active measures against the German domination because of nationalistic reasons, however their activity did not lead to any difficulties of special importance.

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According to the announcements on the creation of the General Government that the Poles could lead their lives according to their customs, that they may retain their own characteristics, and that they could earn their bread by work under just domination, the mass of the Poles saw the possibilities at the beginning of being able to lead an existence, befitting human beings, according to their viewpoint. On the other hand, the public devaluation of the entire, many times only misled Polish people, which had a devastating effect on the national feeling of the Poles, the annexation of parts of the Polish people into the Reich territory, the removal of other national groups (e.g. Ukrainians, White-Ruthenians) from the sphere of domination of the Poles, and the splitting away of national groups, who are considered by the Poles as belonging to their people (e.g. Gozalen) has exerted an unfavorable influence on the attitude of the mass of the Polish people. The action, establishing German ancestry (Deutschstaemmigkeitsaktion), which was not carried out very tactically at all times, has had the same results. But all these measures alone would not have led in the General Government with the exception of an increase of the nationalistic tendencies that the mass of the Polish people would have found themselves ready for an active or even only

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a passive resistance against the German administration.

In the course of time, a series of measures of consequences of the German rule have led to a substantial Ddeterioration of morale of the entire Polish people in the General Government. These measures have affected either certain professions or the entire population and frequently - often with crushing severity - the fate of individuals.

1) The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of the urban population the majority of which is working for the German interests.
   Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus in the territory of the former Polish state and despite the negligence on the part of their former political leaders.

2) The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and the expropriation and expulsion of Polish peasants from maneuver areas and from German settlements without compensation.

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3) Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in commerce and trade and in the realm of private property.

4) Mass arrests and mass executions by the German police who applied the system of collective responsibility.

5) The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.

6) The extensive paralyzation of cultural activities.

7) The closing of high schools, colleges and universities.

8) The limitation, even the complete elimination of Polish influence from the administration of the state.

9) The curtailment of the influence of the Catholic church curtailing its extensive influence - an undoubtedly necessary move - and, in addition, until quite recently, closing and confiscation monasteries, schools and charitable institutions which erected and controlled by the church, often at a moments notice.

In contrast to the treatment of the Polish population in the .

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General Government, the other national groups and parts of them were in a considerably better situation. The Ukrainians, Coralen, White-Ruthenians, Russians, Caucasians and Tartars remained very much safe from actions against the security of their person or their property. To a great extent they also had the possibility, although under German supervision, to be active according to their national characteristics in the [illegible] in the cultural field and the educational system. In part, they were also treated more favorably in respect to food. The religious congregations of these groups, the Greek-Catholics, the Greek-Orthodox Church and the Mohammedan congregations were supported by the German administration in contrast to the conditions in the former Polish state.

As a consequence of this considerably better treatment of the non-Polish national groups of the General-Government, these showed from the beginning a general open-mindedness toward German goals and especially toward the necessities of war. The silently recognized representative organizations of these national groups together with their religious congregations have always employed themselves actively and propagandistically for the German demands. During the seizure of the agricultural products and during the recruiting of workers for the Reich territory, these national groups have made measures, frequently

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severe for the individual, understandable to their compatriots, and pointed out again and again that above all the non-Germans under his protection must at least contribute to the combatting of Bolshevism, for which the German soldier risks his life, by making available their total working power and production for victory.

Above that, these national groups have expressed again and again their desire to be allowed to stand up with weapons in their hands against the Soviets, and have emphasized this readiness for active commitment by reporting as volunteers. By that in the seizure of agricultural products as well as in the recruiting of workers, performances have been achieved which put the contribution of all other countries, working in the German sphere of domination, far in the background, considering their relative capacity of performance. Despite the treatment of the foreign workers, brought to Germany from the General Government, which was considered discrimination in comparison with that of members of other European peoples, and the absolutely insufficient welfare possibilities for their families, who remained behind, unrelatively high reserves of workers were procured for that.

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In contrast to that the different treatment, always made conscious to the Poles, of the individual national groups in the General Government, especially also the measures of the German agencies, which resulted in the restriction and the endangering of the life of the individual Pole, led in an gradually increasing extent that even the large mass of the Polish people showed more and more the inclination to participate in a passive, even in an active resistance against the German domination. The most overwhelming part of the population in the General Government (approx, 10 millions) are Poles. The above mentioned voluntary performances of the favored national groups comprise only the smaller part of the war economical achievements until now for the Reich in the field of industrial production and the production of food items. The Poles carried the main share of that. If despite their bad treatment by the German rule, the present performances could be achieved in the Vistula area, then this fact is not only a proof of the patience and spirit of toleration of the mass of the Polish people, but above that also a sign that the overwhelming part of the Polish farmers

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and workers have a strong foundation of loyalty toward the German regulations and their hard demands. The attitude of the Poles has been worsened continuously by the long series of measures, instigated against the Polish population during the past year. In addition to that, at present the skilled and unscrupulous agitation of the Bolshevists grows continuously which by constant keeping awake of the memory of German measures among the Polish population, instigated a constantly increasing hate against everything German.

As a consequence, the security situation has developed especially unfavorably in the General Government. A German counter-propaganda against the extremely skilled Bolshevist infiltration, which in many cases only has to show the German methods truthfully, has from the very beginning only small hope for success.

III. <u>The possibilities to include the Polish people in the active combatting of Bolshevism.</u>

The finding of the mass graves near KATYN offer the opportunity today to introduce a basic change in the treatment of the Poles, without that

this change of policy of the German command could be interpreted as weakness. However, external means of propaganda alone are not able to cause a concrete change of attitude. If a change of German-Polish relations is not added in important points, then this favorable opportunity for the inclusion of the native population of the General Government into the anti-Bolshevist front would have passed irrevocably.

If the Polish people should make the war aims of the axis powers in the battle of the fate of Europe its own, it should certainly at least understand them, then an explanation about the future fate of the Polish people in the new European area can hardly be postponed any longer. The stronger and the more apparent the German leadership and the living conditions of the individual under them differs from the Bolshevist domination of force and Bolshevist form of life and economy, the more the fight against Bolshevism will appear to every foreign people as more justified and more necessary.

Thus an exploitation of the KATYN atrocities will be dependent on the prerequisite that such slaughters will have to be refrained from under

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German leadership. The foreign people must gradually get the impression that the Germans will replace the Bolshevist World for Europe with a clearer and better principle. It is regrettable that today in Polish public opinion, and not only in the frequently prejudiced intelligentsia KATYN is being compared with mass - deaths in German concentration camps, and with shootings of men, women, even children and old people, during cumulative punishment in the guerilla territories. It need not be emphasized that these punitive messures do not affect, in most cases, the actual offenders. The ones who are affected are in many cases those who do not even approve the activities of these bands, as in their unprotected and unarmed status they are easy victims of the arbitrary acts of the bands, and therefore give to the bands apparent support, only forced by direct terror, from which - unfortunately- under the present conditions, the German rule cannot give them protection.

I consider it important to emphasize again that I regard the clearing up of German - Polish relations as a matter of common sense rather

than a matter of emotions. It is important to utilize ruthlessly the whole war potential under the tremendous harnessing of all forces to conclude the war victoriously. Recruiting of the Polish people into the defensive front against Bolshevism is - at a time when lack of German manpower becomes more and more noticable - an inevitable necessity of the present hour. Useless ideologies and falsely conceived mastery will not benefit the Reich under the present tense circumstances.

I mentioned above that the overwhelming majority of the Polish people are politically indifferent. It would be wrong to disregard the fact that as a result of extremely clever Bolshevist propaganda, extreme distress and wrong methods of treatment, wide masses of the people awaken from this indifference. The resistance groups grow steadely, the Communistic movement gains more and more ground. Once this movement reaches a certain strength, by its weight it will carry with it - like

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an avalanch - even those circles which today stand apart from any political ambitions. The only supposition to their cooperation, or even the only supposition which will make them behave further in a legal way, is their conviction that German leadership would bring to the Polish people order, security, and some means of cultural development, for which goal it would be worth while fighting the Bolshevist efforts of equalization.

Before I will go into detail as to what measures may be employed and what would have to be eliminated or changed in governing the Polish people, may I yet shortly take a stand on the

IV., Memorandum of the "United Polish Organizations of the Miecz i Plug Movement" regarding the military participaties of the Polish people in the combatting of Bolshevism.

One cannot deny a widespread response throughout the Polish nation to the desire of active participation in the military struggle with

Bolshevism.

The memorandum of the "United Polish Military Organizations of the Miecz 1 Plug Movement" originates from a movement which at present does not exercise any important influence on the public opinion of the Polish people. Its leadership contains people who belong to the Polish intelligentsia of old conservative views, mostly older people who experienced the pre-war conditions in Galicia. The greater part of their former followers went over to the active Nationalist groups and even to those with Bolshevist ideologies. The "ZWZ" (Secret Polish Military Organization) and "SZ-NIEC" (OMR) mentioned in the memorandum have the strongest influence on Polish public opinion. The ranks of the ZWZ are essentially composed of followers of the former Polish Government while young National Democrats recognizing the authoritarian state idea, represent the policies of the OMR. Both directions cooperate closely wherein the

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response in the mass of the Polish people. Lately however the activities of the PPR, strengthened by Soviet terroristic groups found new support, mainly from peasants who have been dispossessed without any recompensation and thus have been uprooted, or who feared cumulative punitive measures or other up to now politically indifferent Poles, who wanted to avoid interference by Germans.

There are certain considerations, based on the experiences of the World War, against the desire expressed in the memorandum of the "Sword and Plow" organization to have closed Polish military formations created for the combatting of Bolshevism. In Galicia PILSUDSKI carried on the training of a revolutionary Polish army since 1905, tolerated by the Austrian administration. Since 1908 the fighting groups have been united into "Rifle Associations" and they were to form the basis for future Polish legions. Even for a longer period before the World War an agreement existed between PILSUDSKI as leader of the Polish Rifle Associations and the Austrian General Staff, according to which the Polish military organizations would join the Austrian army as

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separate units. This "Polish Legion" of PILSUDSKI has been committed during the World War by the Austrian side, but as a result of its unreliability has later on been disbanded. After the Central Powers proclaimed the creation of a Polish Kingdom, the legion was to become the basis for the future army of the new Polish state. The year 1917 proved the complete failure of this policy. The activation of a Polish Army proved to be impossible. The legionnaires who saw the goal of their fight - that is the liberation of Poland by the Central Powers - as having been achieved, refused the oath. PILSUDSKI was arrested. Various experiences have been made with Poles, conscripted into the German or Austrian Army from POSEN, WEST PRUSSIA and GALICIA. Many desertions have been confirmed during the World War, through the influence of Allied propaganda and by Polish circles subservient to them. Besides that, a considerable part of conscripted Poles has done it duty until the end of the World War. The experiences gained during the World War cannot be transferred to the present

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just as they are, because the European mission of the combatting of Bolshevism gives this war an entirely different purpose than the one which was to be achieved by the World War. Bolshevism endangers not only the individual existence, but also the mass of the Polish people in their national existence. Poles of nationalist feelings and those who were indifferent realized this danger only after the KATYN case. Therefore it would be worth careful consideration whether at least the Eastern-Galician Poles who were under Bolshevist rule for a short time, and the even now politically much calmer Poles of Western Galicia should not be allowed - under suitable security measures - to establish formations of units similar to the Waffen-SS Division Galicia created for the Ukrainians. It would be recommended that the family members of those Poles from the General Government who even now are employed in the Armed Forces within service units as for example truckdivers, technicians or other help, should be afforded security regarding food as well as death benefits.

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V. Measures with the Aim of Effectively Using the Polish People in the Combatting of Bolshevism.

Instead of the problem of military participation in the European struggle the measures will be far more important for final German victory, which contribute to the calming down of the Polish population and its utilization outside of military commitment for the preparation of economic foundations for the German war effort.

1.) The great mass of the Polish population is entirely insufficiently clad and fed. Through the textile supply condition which occured in the fourth year of the war, an improvement in the field of textile supply - even if it is only a sufficient supply for the workers -cannot be achieved, as well as making available of sufficient heating material will be impossible. A consolidation of the food situation of the Polish population would be a decisive factor for the improvement of their morale and attitude. The food rations, at the present officially allocated mainly to the mass of the urban population and to the

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parts of the population who are employed in non-agricultural enterprises are far from sufficient even for the establishment of only the most necessary food supply for the individual. Since, in contrast with the supply of consumer goods for the population, the food supply of the masses, working in the national interest was sufficient, [illegible] the nutritive condition of the masses who are employed in large parts of the Soviet area, the food question is a favorable breading ground for Communist propaganda slogans.

The population, if it only wants to keep alive, is forced to procure additional necessary food on the black market. Because of the low income level, a large part of the population is unable to secure the necessary food because of high black market prices. They are forced to look around for a mostly illegal side income at the expense of the work assigned to them. Their health condition and as result, their working power declines more and more, the danger of epidemics rises, especially tuberculosis increases by leaps and bounds. Many, actually orderly elements succumb sooner or later to the temptation

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to join bandit groups, which frequently try to secure consumer goods for their own use, besides committing sabotage and destruction according to plan. The granting of sufficient rations, which however necessitates a revision of the delivery quotas for the Reich, which at this time by far exceed the productive capacity of the General Government, cannot be avoided. The Polish worker may be more frugal than the Czech, French or Belgian worker; but the rations, granted to him in contrast to these foreign groups for the severe cold of his country, are only fragements of the already barely sufficient means of existence of the other foreign groups.

2) The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for participation in the cultural field has led, down to the lowest classes of the Polish people to serious discontent. The Polish middle and upper classes are extremely hungry for education. Experience shows

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that the possibility of a cultural occupation would at the same time be connected with a diversion from the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently comes across the objection, brought up by the Poles, that the restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German authorities does not only show no difference towards the Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that it even remains below the amount of cultural activity, allowed among Soviet citizens. It does not stop the effectiveness of the Bolshevist agitation, that Bolshevism offers to its citizens only cultural activity, trimmed down for purposes of political instigation.

3) The closings of colleges, high schools and secondary schools, are on the same basis. Its well considered purposes are without doubt the decline of the Polish educational standard. The realization of this goal appears, considering the necessities of war, not always beneficial to the German interests. With the duration of the war the

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German interest in the mobilization of able foreign replacements increases in the various fields of knowledge. However more important is the fact that the crippling of the school system and the extensive hampering of cultural activities adds in rising proportions to the promotion of a Polish "National Community" (Volksgemeinschaft) conspiring against Germany, under the leadership of the intelligentsia. What was not possible during the course of Polish history, what even could not be done during the first year of the German administration, namely the achievment of a goal, which was aimed at a common purpose and a national community (Volksgemeinschaft) holding together from within for better and for worse, threatens now to become slowly but surely reality because of German measures. The German leadership cannot pass this process of alliance of individual Polish classes without noticing it in the face of the growing defensive power of the Poles. The German leadership should promote class distinctions by certain cultural concessions and if possible to play one class against the other.

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4.) The recruiting of labor and the methods, though often under the inevitable pressure of the circumstances, observed, have created, furthered by clever Bolshevist agitation, a tremendous feeling of hate in wide circles. The workers won thus, come often with a deep resolution for positive resistance, even active sabotage. An improvement of the recruiting methods in connection with the continuation of the attempts to stop still present abuses in the treatment of Polish workers in the Reich, finally a care even if it is only meager, for the family members left behind, would cause a rise in morale, which would convert itself into an increased desire to work, and increased production for the German interest.

5.) The German administration was organized at the beginning of the war with the removal of the Polish element from all important positions. The available amount of German help had always been quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient. Besides, during

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the past year a considerable delivery of German personnel had to take place under pressure of the replacement needs of the Armed Forces. Previously, non-German help had to be called in to a greater extent. By a considerable change in the treatment of the Poles, the administration could, by use of all necessary precaution, use the Polish element more for collaboration , without which the administration considering the present amount of personnel, not to speak of future transfers, cannot be kept working. The increased participation of Poles would help further to raise the morale in itself.

Besides the positive change put down in these proposals, a number of methods, observed previously in the treatment of Poles, need a change or even must be completely abandoned at least for the duration of the fighting in Europe.

1.) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation and evacuation of arable land have caused great and irrepairable

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damages for the agricultural production. Not less great is the damage to morale connected naturally with such actions. Already the seizure of a great part of the Polish large estates has embittered the naturally anti-Bolshevistically inclined strata of the population, hit by it. But their opposing attitude does not count nearly so much, because of their numerically small strength and their complete segregation from the mass of the people, as the position of the mass of the population consisting mainly of small farmers.

The evacuation of Polish farmers from the defense zone - doubtlessly necessitated by military-political reasons - has already had an unfavorable effect on the mentality and attitude of many farmers. At any rate, this evacuation has been kept within certain territorial limits. It has been carried out carefully prepared by the governmental offices, having avoided all unnecessary harshness. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the LUBLIN district, held necessary by the Reich

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Commissioner for the strengthening of German nationalities (Volkstum), for the purpose of settling German nationals there has been much more serious in proportion. Added to that - as I already reported separately - it was carried out at a pace and by methods which caused immeasurable bitterness among the populace. At short notice families were torn apart, those able to work were sent to the Reich while old people and children were assigned to empty Jewish ghettos. This happened during the winter 1942/43, when great losses occurred especially among members of the last group. The evacuation brought with itself a complete expropriation of movable and inmovable property of the farmers. The entire population fell for the believe that the previous deportations meant the beginning of a total deportation of the Poles from the region of the General Government. The general impression was that the Pole would have a fate similar to that of the Jews. The evacuation in the District LUBLIN was a welcome opportunity for the Communist agitation

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in order to poison for a long time the attitude of the entire General Government, even in the annexed Eastern territories by the skill, for which it is known. This had the result that considerable parts of the population in the deportation territories, but also in territories not touched by it, escaped into the woods and increased the bands considerably. The consequence was a tremendous deterioation of the security situation. These people, driven to despair, are misused by skillful agents to upset agricultural and industrial production according to a definite plan.

2) Already at the first mention of the crime of KATYN, it became obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an absolute condition for the incorporation of the Polish population into the defensive fight against Bolshevism.

The lack of protection against seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions constitutes a primary argument in Communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children and old men in plain public, which takes place

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again and again without the knowledge and against the will of the Fuehrer must be prevented under all circumstances. This does not apply naturally to the executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of collective pernishments which nearly always hit innocent people and which are directed against people who in their basic attitude are politically indifferent, the unfavorable, psychological effect is immeasurable. Serious punitive measures and executions should only be carried out after a procedure satisfying the most primitive conceptions of justice and under publication of the sentence.

Even if the court procedure is carried on in such a simple, imperfect and improvised manner, it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a punitive measure which the population considers as purely arbitrary, and hampers the Bolshevist agitation which claims the German measures there to be only the prelude for future incidents. Added to this is that collective punishment, which naturally is directed primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced people

H0660-0065

or desperate ones, are not exactly judged as a sign of strength of the ruling power from which the population expects that it will hit the terrorists themselves and that it liberates them thus from the insecurity which burdens them.

However, I consider it my duty to point out that an improvement of attitude urgently necessary in the face of the serious consequences of the policy until now, can come only gradually, and that the new course must be guided very carefully. As proof for the degree of distrust toward the German leadership, I enclose a significant extract from the report of the commander of the Security Police and of the SD in the General Government for the period from 1 to 31 May 1943 which concerns itself with opportunities for propaganda, resulting from KATYN. It says:

...../ A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, the same as before, will not let itself be influenced by the news from KATYN and charges the Germans with supposedly the same atrocities, especially AUSCHWITZ. Among the large mass of the Polish population, the news from KATYN did not show any results having a favorable trend for Germany.

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On the one hand the fact will also hardly be disputed amongst the working classes, insofar as they are not communistically inclined, that at the same time it is pointed out that Germany's attitude towards the Poles is also no better. There are, to be sure, the concentration camp at Auschwitz and Maidanek, where the mass-murders of Poles continuously took place. Only in quite isolated cases it is pointed out that there is actually a difference between the murdering of innocent officers and putting illegally active persons out of action. "

3.) Besides the most important suppositions mentioned in 1.) and 2.), for the pacification of the General Government, security of property among the non-agricultural people, must also be confirmed, to be granted insofar as it is not opposed by urgent needs of war. The appropriations or confiscations without compensation in the industrial sector, in commerce and trade and other private property was not to take place in any case, insofar as the owner or the custodian has not committed an offense against the German authorities. If the use of industrial enterprises, commercial

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concerns, or real estate is necessary for war-essential reasons, it should be preceded in every case under avoidance of hardships and guarantee of appropriate compensation. Through such a procedure the initiative of Polish employers would on one side be furthered and on the other hand, damage to the interests of German war economy would be avoided.

4.) With the influencing of the attitude of the Poles an importance is due to the influence of the Catholic Church, which cannot be entirely overestimated. I do not mistake that the Catholic Church always belonged to the leading fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous clergymen also made their influence felt, even after the German occupation. Also, hundreds of arrests were carried out in these circles. A series of priests were taken to concentration camps and also shot. However, in order to win the sentiment of the Polish population, at least a legal attitude of the church is necessary, if not cooperation as well. It can be won without any doubt, especially today under the effect

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of the crimes of Katyn, for a reinforcement of the defensive front against Bolshevism with the Polish people, which must already, out of instinct of self-preservation, refuse a Bolshevistic reign in the Vistula area. However it is a prerequisite for that to refrain in the future from all measures against their activity and their property insomuch as they are not necessitated by immediate war-interests. Damages exceeding by far the advantages obtained in the individual cases, have been caused up to the most recent time by the closing of monasteries, churches and welfare institutions, which had a deteriorating effect on the existing readiness for anti-Bolshevist activities of the church. I remember in that connection the extremely clever Bolshevist propaganda, which during the occupation of Eastern Galicia allowed the Catholic Church for propaganda reasons to continue their activity and retain their property. In view of the importance of the influence of the Catholic church, the granting of compensation (maybe the re-opening of one of

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the closed seminaries for priests) should be seriously considered.

My Fuehrer, I beg you to understand my report as a result of by burning desire to conquer an important aid for the German people in the most difficult phase of its struggle for existence. I do not take a position in my assertions as to the ultimate aims which the German leadership will realize after the successful struggle for existence in the East. It seems to me, however, that damage was caused by the fact that ultimate and present aims were to be realized without the cool estimate of real possibilities either simultaneously or without the proper coordination.

I also beg you to be convinced that I do not intend to execute the measures I propose in a noisy manner or in any other way which might lead to interpret the Polish question as a weakness of the German leadership. I would rather weigh the execution of these measures with the utmost caution, care and vigilance according to the degree and the time. My highest rule of conduct in those

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extremely difficult questions, however, will always be my complete and unerring loyalty to you and your epoch-making work.

Hail to you, my Fuehrer

Yours

signed: FRANK

Enclosed:
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of Orig.)

Copy of Document: 2476 - PS

I, Ministerialdirektor J o s e f B u e h l e r, Dr. Jur. in custody since the 30th May 1945, State Secretary to Governor General Dr. Hans Frank, in the General Government (Poland) from 1940 - 1945, herewith declare on oath:

During the suppression of the Warsaw Rising of 1944, about 50,000 - 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (Polish estimate) were transported to German Concentration Camps. As a result of a demarche by General Governor Dr. Frank with Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the latter forbade further deportations, The Governor General attempted to obtain the release of the 50,000 - 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw who had been put into Concentration Camps in the Reich, before deportation was stopped. The Chief of RSHA, Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, had refused this in writing and also refused my verbal efforts when I personally visited him in Berlin, in September or October 1944, on the grounds that those inhabitants of Warsaw were employed making secret weapons for the Reich and, therefore, there was no question of a general release. Single requests he was willing to investigate. Kaltenbrunner had subsequently complied with individual requests for release from a Concentration Camp. As opposed to the Polish estimate, Kaltenbrunner gave the number of inhabitants of Warsaw transported into Concentration Camps in the Reich as small. I made Kaltenbrunner's statement regarding the number brought into

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custody accessible to my appropriate Office and after renewed investigations I received confirmation that the number was 50,000 - 60,000. These were the people who had been brought into Concentration Camps in Germany.

Signed: Dr. Josef Buehler

Signed and sworn before me on 4. November 1945 in Nuernberg, Germany

Signed: WHITNEY R. HARRIS, Lt. USNR

Copy of Document: I-49-USA-473.

H0660-0073

I, Otto HOFMANN — SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen SS und Polizei (Lt. Gen. of SS and Police), finally hoehrer SS and Polizeifuehrer (higher SS and police leader) in Military District (Wehrkreis) 5, declare herewith:

1. From 1941 to April 1943 I was chief of the main office for Race and Settlement questions. As such it was my duty to provide for the instruction (with respect to agriculture) of SS co. that these would be settled on farms in of crippled members of the occupied territories, including Poland. I was, therefore, as a rule, kept informed about all orders concerning re-settlement in Poland.

2. The executive power, in other words the carrying out of all so-called resettlement actions, that is to say, sending away of Polish and Jewish settlers and those of non-German blood from a territory in Poland destined for Germanization, was in the hands of the Chief of the RSHA (HEYDRICH and later KALTENBRUNNER, since the end of 1942. The Chief of the RSHA also supervised and issued orders to the so-called immigration center (EWZ) which classified the Germans living abroad who returned to Germany and directed them to the individual farms already freed. The latter was done in agreement with the chief office of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

3. I know these facts mentioned in paragraph 2 through the orders concerned, as well as owing to the continuous contact between the two chief offices and various cases of friction. Questions of conflicts as to competence were mostly decided in favor of the chief of the RSHA (HEYDRICH later KALTENBRUNNER, Reichsfuehrer HIMMLER had a decisive influence in all these questions.

Signed: Otto HOFMANN

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This declaration has been written down by my own hand on two pages at Freising, Germany, on the 4 August 1945 at 1400 hours. This has been done of my own free will.

I swear to God the Almighty that I will say nothing but the truth, that I will withhold nothing nor add anything.

Signed: Otto HOFMANN

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Freising, Germany this 4th day of August 1945.

Signed: Ernest H. BLOCH
1st Lt. MI AUS
Investigating Officer

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Dr. 1

Statements of the former Kreishauptmann and NSDAP-Standort-fuehrer Dr. jur. Hein ALBRECHT for the exoneration of the former Governor General Dr. Hans FRANK, defendant in NUERNBERG war criminal trials.

Contents.

1. The motives for the report.
2. The personal circumstances of the reporter.
3. Limitation to the report of the significant directives given and comments made by the defendant Dr. FRANK, generally in public and especially to the reporter as subordinate.
4. The struggle of Dr. FRANK against the exploitation and neglect of the General-Government in favor of the Reich. Conflict with BERLIN.
5. Dr. FRANK concerning the attitude and performance of the Germans working in the General-Government.
6. The personal effort of Dr. FRANK in connection with his reconstruction efforts.
7. Dr. FRANK as enemy of violence against the native population, especially as enemy of the SS.
8. The sending of non-German workers from the General-Government to the Reich.

1. The motives for the report.

According to the official news bulletins of the Royal British Military Government circulated by the directorate of my interment camp, the President of the USA TRUMAN has announced in his solemn declaration at the end of the war that the victorious powers were conscious of the responsibility for the foundation of a lasting world peace placed upon them by the victory obtained. Therefore, after the end of the bloodshed, with sacred seriousness and full strength they would now seek and take the proper measures to exclude the reoccurrence of such catastrophies in the future. Along the same lines also the chief prosecutor

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has - at the NUERNBERG War Criminal Trials - in the opening of his prosecution speech given expression to the desire on part of the victorious powers, even though fate had already spoken in their favor, to investigate the violation of human rights and international law by the previous German leadership by careful and objective Court trial, in the interest of securing a lasting world peace.

Confident in these declarations, the undersigned asks to have the following statements admitted to the High Tribunal in NUERNBERG and to the defense of the defendant Dr. FRANK. The motives for this action are neither political nor selfish, but rather an urge by human conscience to contribute all that is within his limited power to bring the unadulterated truth before the high Tribunal.

2. Personal circumstances of the reporter.

About his personal circumstances he states that from 11 September 1939 until 3 August 1941 he was stationed as Kreishauptmann in KONSKIE, district RADOM, and from 7 August 1941 until 23 September 1944 as Kreishauptmann in STANISLAU district GALICIA being at the same time Standorffuehrer of the NSDAP there. In the first Kreishauptmannschaft the population was Polish, in the second of predominantly Ukrainian nationality. In the course of military developments this task has been ended and he reported to fulfil his soldierly duty. He was wounded in the defensive action on the Oder 30 km south of STETTIN on 21 April 1945 while serving as Pfc. with the Panzer Gren. Ers. Ba. 73. Discharged to his home by the Germans, he completely abstained from all political activities.

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and his administrative profession and worked as farmer with the sole aim to feed his family of many children by the work of his hands on a small rented farm. After 5 months of farm - work he has been arrested by the British Security Service on 15 October 1945 and since then he has be n interned by the British.

3. Limitation to the report of the significant directives given and comments made by the defendant Dr. FRANK generally in public and specifically to the reporter as subordinate.

Since the particulars of the indictment against the former Governor General are not known to him, he limits himself to reporting the remarks addressed and directives issued to him by the defendant generally in public and also as subordinated Kreishauptmann and Standortfuehrer of the NSDAP especially during the first 5 years of war, his observations on their execution and their reception by the native population. They show the behaviour of the defendant in the leading of the administration and of the NSDAP in the former General Government in view of the daily life of the Polish and West Ukrainian population of the Kreishauptmannschaft.

4. The struggle of Dr. FRANK against the exploitation and neglect of the General Government in favor of the Reich. Conflict with BERLIN.

The first meeting with Dr. FRANK occurred shortly after the foundation of the General Government in the Fall of 1939 in the Polish district-capital RADOM where the 10 Kreishauptmannner of these districts had to report concerning the condition of the population of their administrative districts and the problems of a possibly quick and effective reconstruction of the general as well as the administrative and economic life.

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Outstanding was the special attention shown by Dr. FRANK and his deep concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression in the instructions not to consider or treat the General Government or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation or as a useless area, but rather as a centre of public order (Ordnungszelle) and an area of concentration at the back of the fighting German front and at the gtes of the German homeland, like a bridge of Land between the two. Therfore the loyal native inhabitants of this country have as citizens of the GG a claim to the full protection of the German administration. For this purpose the constant efforts of all authorities and economic units would be demanded by him, and, by constant control through supervising authorites, be personally superintended by him through periodic inspection trips with the participation of the central expert authorities. In this way, for example, the two district captaincies (Kreishauptmannschaften) which were administered by me were in the course of four years inspected by him personally three times.

In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who believed it possible to import more from the General Government into the Reich than was advisable, Dr. FRANK represented vigorously the political independence of the General Government as an annex (Nebenland) of the Reich. and his own independence as being directly subordinated to the Supreme Head of the State only, and not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account to comply with demands of that kind which might come to us on the basis of personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or the specialist ministries in the Reich, but, if we should come into a conflict with the loyalty to the Reich which was equally expected from us, to report him about it. This firm attitude brought Dr. FRANK the displeasure of the Berlin government circles, and the nickname "France" (Frankreich) to the General Government.

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A campaign of calumny has been initiated in the Reich against him and against the entire administration of the General Government by systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same time attempting to belittle the actual constructive achievements.

5. Dr. FRANK concerning the attitude and achievements of the Germans who worked in the General Government.

Regarding the attitude and achievements of Germans assigned to, or admitted into, the former General Government, it must be honestly admitted that side by side with a number of idealists of a high level who were conscious of their responsibility there were some who proved themselves as not being suitable for leadership of an alien people and who seriously damaged German prestige in the world; they had come from a modest background in the interior of Germany and for the first time occupied leading or influential positons and faced difficult tasks. But would it be just do condemn Dr. FRANK because of these failures? In my opinion this could only be done if he had violated his leadership obligations. On the contrary, he was tirelessly engaged in appealing to the conscience of the Germans, and with an expression of thanks for previous achievements he always combined the strongest call to increase their devotion to attitude and achievement. In addition to numerous official meetings of civil servants and leaders of economic life he worked along those lines especially in his capacity as Leader of the Regional Work District of the NSDAP. While addressing Political Leaders, for example, he unmasked the slogan of the "German Master Race", which had penetrated from the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, as a completely misleading one, since no people as a collective entity could be "master", and asserted that

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Germans should rather consider themselves as members of a leadership nation, among whom the obligation to exemplary attitude and achievement would have to take precedence over everything. He charged us with instructing the other Germans accordingly, although without imparing their self-confidence in foreign territory.

6. Dr. FRANK's personal style of living in relationship to his constructive achievements.

The most diverse rumors were spread about Dr. FRANK's personal style of living. With reference to that there are two examples which I myself have experienced and which show the contradiction: When Dr. FRANK was in RADOM at the opening of a large exhibition of the District of RADOM, the Governor of that time, Dr. LASCH gave a banquet consisting of several courses. After Dr. FRANK had viewed the menu, his forehead began to cloud over, and after soup, fish and a vegetable course he brought the meal to a close before the poultry course, in order to further occupy himself with the work of the district administration. On another occasion, when the Ukrainian rural population of the District of ROHATYN on the Dnjstr welcomed Dr. FRANK at his first official visit in STANISLAU (Galicia) in October 1941, and by according the old custom of bread and salt presented with with a saddled horse, out of gratitude he made a counter-present - as he used to do in cases of this kind - of 10.000 Zloty for the support of horse-breeding in ROHATYN.

If the household on the CRACOW Fortress has perhaps exceeded the framework of a burgeois household, then this could be countered by the amount of energies and original ideas which have repeatedly gone out into the internally torn country from this fortress.

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connecting and invigorating all fields of live anew. It is requested, for example that the "Deutsche Krakauer Zeitung" be looked through only once, just to show how many guiding articles and speeches by Dr. FRANK are contained in it. That a man of such a large intellectual productivity must replenish his spent energies again should meet the understanding of a person of good judgment. In addition, I request that the annual reports of Deputy Minister (Staatssekretaer) Dr. BUEHLER in connection with the reconstruction achievements of the Governor General be looked into. I refrain from mentioning the reconstruction achievement in the District Captaincies (Kreishauptmannschaften) of KONSKIE and STANISLAU, directed by me for the sake of brevity but I could furnish sufficient impressiv material from memory; instead I take the liberty of submitting the petition from the Polish population of the district with 50 pages of signatures from all classes of the people who were willing to work on reconstruction, and a servic performance testimonial on my work in STANISLAU as enclosures 1 and 2. Numerous photographs, which were in the pictorial archives of the Governor General with photo correspondent ROESNER, could also confirm my statements.

7. Dr. FRANK as an Opponent of Violent Actions against the Native Population Especially as an Opponent of the SS.

Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the General Government, the accusation of the enslaving of the native population as well as their deportation into the Reich and many atrocities of various kinds appeared in the newspaper reports on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials and are presented as serious evidence against Dr. FRANK. As far as atrocities are concerned, the guilt does not lie with Dr. FRANK, but in part with the numerous non - German agitators and provocateurs who increased.

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with the additional pressure against the fighting German fronts increased their underground activity, and for the rest chiefly with the former Deputy Minister (Staatssekretaer) for the Security Organization in the General Government, SS Obergruppenfuehrer KRUEGER and his agencies. My observations, however, in this respect are sketchy because of the strict secrecy of these offices.

On the other hand, Dr. FRANK went so far in accomodating the Polish population that this was frequently objected to by his German compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the justified interests of the Polish population, is proven, for example, by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish area took place without a noteworthy disturbance, and that the Eastern railroad could let the troop transports move with Polish personnel up to the most forward unloading points without having them delayed by sabotage. The cases of paying honor to the loyal part of the Polish population, beginning with the great harvest thanksgiving celebrations of the farmers up to the individual honers given persons who distinguished themselves in the reconstruction, are too numerous to be mentioned here. The same applies accordingly to the Ukrainian population of Galicia which was friendly towards Germany.

This humane attitude of Dr. FRANK, which earned him respect and sympathy among considerable groups of the natives, led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, among whose circles HIMMLER's saying: " They shall not love us, but fear us", circulated as a key word of their thinking and action.

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At times it came to a complete break. I remember exactly that Dr. FRANK during a government visit of the Carpathian districts of the District Captaincy (Kreishauptmannschaft) of STANISLAU in the summer of 1943 in JAREMTSCHE on PRUTH complained most bitterly during a lonely walk with me and my wife about the arbitrary acts of the SS which quite frequently crossed his political course. At that time he called the SS the "Black Plague", and pointed out when he noticed our astonishment at hearing such criticism even from his mouth that it would, for example, be absolutely unpreventable if my wife should be innocently arrested some day or night by agencies of the GESTAPO and should disappear never to be seen again without having received the possibility of a defense in a legal trial. Some time afterwards, he held a speech before the students in Heidelberg which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded about the necessity of the restablishment of a German constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) as would always have done justice to the real requirements of the Germans. When he wanted to repeat this speech in Berlin, he is said to have, been forbidden by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately forgotten source, to make speeches for 1/4 year at HIMMLER's instigation. The struggle against the methods of violence used by the SS led to a nervous breakdown of Dr. FRANK, which made necessary a fairly long convalescent leave. As far as I can remember this was in the winter of 1943/44.

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8. Deportation of non - German laborers from the General Government into the Reich.

In any case, not Dr. FRANK but the former president of the main section labor of the General Government, Dr. STRUWE is to be made responsible for the forced deportation of Polish and Ukrainian labor to Germany, besides numerous non - German instigtors, according to my observations. How far he has acted upon the order of Gauleiter SAUCKEL the Sonderbeauftragten (special deputy) of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, on this question or how far he want on his own initiative is unknown to me, however, he suppressed knowingly the human attitude towards the problem and only saw to the fulfillment of the contingents. The problem seems to have been submitted to the high Tribunal under strong misdepresentations, according to the newspaper reports. I have, for example seen innumerable natives who went to work in Germany voluntarily during the first four years of my work in Poland an Galicia, as they had already done anyway before the war as so-called wandering workers. Only at that time they were not taken care of by employment agencies free of charge, but for the most part severely exploited by the agents. Widespread sectors of the Polish and Galician territory suffered because of overpopulated villages with numerous needy existences and hopeless views for the future ever since the so-called agricultural reforms of Kosziusko, which attempted to solve the social question in the country by authorizing unlimited division of small properties as heritages. They willingly grasped the opportunity to receive better work and better wages in Germany, and to obtain a better training in the modern German factories.

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They proudly returned on leave to their native villages and in any case wrote very contented letters on numerous occasions. Only with the increase of enemy air attacks on the civilian population in Germany and the secret agitation by the enemy which started simultaneously with the pressure on the front did the stream of volunteers slow up and forced the Reich, of which much had been demanded by the war conditions for many years, to seek replacements in industry, agriculture and trade for the men who had been sent to the fronts. Wherever the enrollment of volunteers was not sufficient the Reich, which was under pressure, demanded that a certain number of workers be furnished by the General Government. By their work in the modern organized factories of Germany they were to help Germany to prevent a return of war on their native soil. However, they were not forced by the Germans to participate in combat, as, for example, the Russians had done. The enrollment was handled by the employment agencies in the General Government which sent innnumerable recruiting officials into the country and which tried to obtain, whenever pssible, voluntary enrollments for the journey into the Reich. Only when this was ineffective, selected according to suggestion or, in cases of refusal, after consulting the local mayor and the community council were the people, who were without possessions worth mentioning and work in connection with the war effort, as well as those who were the most dispensable from their present localities according to their family situation. If they did not obey the order, however, they were located by the police, as was also done with Germans. Certain harships, unfortunately, could be withheld from the non - Germans in the course of the war just as little as was the case with German women, adolescents, and the aged in the Reich territory which was threatened from the air.

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Unfortunately, they were intensified in the case of the Ukrainians by the national hatred of the Polish employees of the German Labor Administration in a way which made it impossible for the German supervision to intervene in all cases. The undersigned, as well as many of his comrades, has given particular attention to this problem, which is so difficult from a human point of view, and found to a great extent the support of the Governor as well as the Labor Administration in this matter. So, for example, he participated at government expense along with two older Ukrainian district residents as freely selected confidential agents in a shipment of that kind, from the first recruiting in the home village to the arrival at the place of labor in Germany, in order to make suggestions afterwards for improvements in a memorandum of about 30 pages, which in part were immediately carried out. That Dr.FRANK on his part attempted to deminish the hardships caused by the imposition of volunteer levies is proved by the honors and acknowledgements given by him to those who followed the call, for example, at his personal welcoming of the millionth worker and his presenting him with a wrist watch at Cracow.

In my attempt to lighten the burdens of the war for the local population as far as possible I enjoyed the full confidence and consent of Dr. FRANK, as also in other cases in my work aiming at right and humanity. He gave expression to this for the last time in the fortress of Cracow on 30 October 1944, when I tendered my resignation to him after the occupation of the District Captaincy (Kreishauptmannschaft) of Stanislau by the victorious Russian army, in order to fulfil my duty as a soldier at the front. Since that day I have the longer had any connection with Dr. FRANK. I declare that he knows nothing of this testimony.

t/ ALBRECHT

(359375) 8 Jan 46.

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Fr. 8

Erich von dem BACH - ZELEWSKI

21 February 1946

Affidavit

Instructed as to the consequences of a false affidavit, I make the following declaration under oath for presentation to the International Military Tribunal in NUERNBERG:

Personal data:

I, Erich von dem BACH - ZELEWSKI, was born on 1 March 1899 in LAUENBURG, Pomerania. At the end of the war I was SS - Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS.

The case:

1. Owing to the infiltration of Russian Partisan groups over the line of the river Bug into the General Government in 1943, HIMMLER declared the General Government to be a "guerilla warfare territory" ("Bandenkampfgebiet"). By this it became my duty, as "Chief of the guerilla warfare units" to travel over the General Government, to gther information and experience and to submit reports and suggestions for fighting the partisans.

   In the general information HIMMLER gave me, he called the Governor General Dr. FRANK a traitor to his country, who was conspiring with the Poles, and whom he would expose to the Fuehrer very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches HIMMLER made aginst FRANK:

   a) At a lawyer's meeting in the Old Reich territory FRANK is said to have stated that "he preferred a bad constitutional State to the best conducted Police State", and

   b) During a speech to a Polish delegation FRANK had disavowed some of HIMMLER's measures and

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had disparaged, in front of the Poles, those charged with carrying them out by calling them "militant personalities".

2) After having personally obtained on a circular tour information on the spot about the situation in the General Government, I visited the higher SS and Police-fuehrer KRUEGER and the Governor General, Dr.FRANK, in CRACOW.

KRUEGER spoke very disapprovingly about Dr.FRANK and made FRANK's faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles responsible for conditions in the General Government, he called for harsher and more inconsiderate measures and said that he would not rest until the traitor FRANK was overthrown. I had the impression, from KRUEGER's statements, that personal motives also influenced his attitude and that he himself would have liked to become Governor General.

After that I had a long discussion with Dr.FRANK, I told him of my impressions, while he went into lengthy details about a new policy for Poland which aimed at the pacification of the Poles by way of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr.FRANK considered the following factors responsible for the sente situation in the General Government:

a) the inconsiderate resettlement action taken now, in the midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless resettlement GLOBOCZNIK the LUBLIN SS and Police-fuehrer and

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b) the insufficient food quota alloted to the General Government. As pronounced enemies of any conciliatory policy Dr.FRANK designated KRUEGER and GLOBOCZNIK who should be recalled without fail. With the conviction that failure by Dr.FRANK would only mean a more inconsiderate and uncompromising person as his successor, I promised him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told FRANK I shared his opinion that KRUEGER and GLOBOCZNIK would have to disappear. He,"Dr FRANK, knew however that, HIMMLER hated him and that he was urging HITLER to have him removed. With such state of affairs any request on FRANK's part to have KRUEGER and GLOBOCZNIK recalled would not only be rejected, but would even strengthen their position with HIMMLER. FRANK should give me a free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved within the shortest possible time. Dr. FRANK agreed to that, and then I made use of military mistakes that KRUEGER and GLOBOCZNIK had committed in order to bring about their recall by HIMMLER.

3). <u>The WARSAW revolt of 1944.</u>

Dr. FRANK had nothing to do with the military suppression of the WARSAW revolt. The Governor of WARSAW, Dr.FISCHER a subordinate of Dr.FRANK, was responsible for all civilian questions in connection with the suppression of the revolt, that is, for the measures for the assistance of the civilian population, their housing, and employment', as well as the administration of their private property. I do not know whether during the revolt Dr.FRANK issued any orders regulations.

H0660-0090

I only remember a visit to my battle H.Q. of State Secretary KRAUSHAAR accompanied by a Polish commission. This commission was to administer the civilian sector in collaborations with the Governor Dr.FISCHER. The time for the start of the revolt was chosen very cleverly. The Middle Army Group had been decisively beaten by the Red Army in the breakthrough at MINSK. The German high command then tried to build up a new line of resestance on the Vistula, east of WARSAW and along the East Prussian border. Everything was thrown into this new line of interception, whether Army or Police. Thus at the decisive moment WARSAW was stripped of its former garrison. The insurgents became masters of the situation in the whole area of the town on their first attack. Those of the military or police units remaining in WARSAW who could not immediately escape to the few remaining strongholds, were annihilated. The fury of the Polish people, repressed for years, seldom gave quarter. As a result, German losses during the first few days were enormous. The battered strongholds fought for their bare lives. Of the more than 7000 missing Germans only a few hundred captives could be returned to the German Command on the day of capitulation. The loss of WARSAW at that time demolished the planned Vistula-position even while it was being built. Therefore, at the very beginning of the revolt HITLER sent Air-Force General STAHEL - who had become known as the defender of WILNA - as combat commander to WARSAW. At the same time HIMMLER went to POSEN to mobilise from there additional fighting forces for the battle of WARSAW. Along with

replacement units and the POSEN Police force HIMMLER ordered the DIRLEWANGER SS-Brigade and the KAMINSKI-Brigade to joinnthe fight for WARSAW. HIMMLER gave the fighting units a supposed order by HITLER accordings to which no prisoners should be taken and the town should be levelled. Furthermore HIMMLER gave permission to the units to loot.

The deployment of the reinforcements faded away right at the outskirts of the city - on one hand- as the insurgents fought with unheard - of Valor, but on the other, the orders to destroy and to loot split up within the shortest time the hitting power of the German formations into disorganized, wild individual actions. The result was a further extension on the part of the insurgents' positions. General STAHEL himself was cut off, with his command post in the center of the city and was therefore greatly handicapped in the deployment of troops.

At this stage I was commissioned with command of all the forces and with supression of the uprising. My measures were:
Rescinding of the orders for looting and destruction, Issuing an order whereby looters and marauders would be punished by immediate shooting, Shooting - under martial law - of Brigadefuehrer KAMINSKI and his staff, for continued toleration of looting and ravaging in regard to the HIMMLER order. Gradual chief by other troops of those found to be undisciplined.

The issuing of an order not only to protect civilians but to take as prisoners even the insurgents, whether in uniform or not.

H0660-0092

Regrouping of own forces and strict coordination in the individual fighting units under responsible leadership.

Energetic combat command, following an exact plan, as a troop that is expected to do severe fighting cannot afford to lose time.

Immediate contact with the opponents, by leaflets dropped from planes, as well as by emissaries, to urge the population to leave the city.

Determining certain times for pauses in fighting, to give the population a chance to leave the city.

Establishment of collecting camps, kitchens, and hospitals for the civilian population, by employment of Polish commissions and doctors. Closest cooperation with the Polish Red Cross.

I have declined to accept a proposal by the Commander-in-Chief of the available Air forces, General Ritter von GREIM, to the effect that as my next move I should withdraw my troops from the city, for during the present untraceable interlocking of fronts a greater effective aerial offensive could not be contemplated, since

a.) a major air attack would practically annihilate the civilian population , as no anti-aircraft equipment existed,

b.) regarding the fanatically brave behaviour of the armed insurgents there was no certain indication that their resistance would thus be broken, and

c.) because my efforts in negotiating a cessation of hostilities in the interest of both peopleswould then become completely hopeless.

H0660-0093

In systematic house and street fighting which lasted for weeks and caused tremendous losses to both sides, we succeeded in confining the centre of the revolt more and more.

The German attempt to accelerate the attack by the use of tanks failed quickly and had to be discontinued entirely, because every armored vehicle was destroyed in the shortest time by death-defying youths and girls by means of gasoline bottles. All the streets were very cleverly blocked by countless 5 to 10 meter-high barricades and every block of houses transformed into a fortress. Each block of buildings had to be captured separately in the bloodiest hand-to-hand fighting, and it was altogether impossible to approach without blasting breaches and laying underground mines. But even the breaking into a block of buildings did not mean its possession. Each floor and even each room and cellar had to be fought for separately. In several blocks of houses it occurred that the two opposing parties were facing each other in confusion in combat for days and even weeks in the underground cellars and passages, the various rooms changing hands several times during the day. Even the surrounding of whole rows of streets did not have the desired result, as a clever Polish leadership knew that at the last moment, through the subterranean canals, the Polish troops could avoid being taken prisoners. A particularly criminal moment for the German command arose when the Red Army took PRAGA and the German garrison of PRAGA did not retreat to WARSAW across the bridges of the VISTULA, as foreseen, but was pushed east of the VISTULA to the north. My troops had fortunately just been able to clear the insurgents from a small strip of the shore.

H0660-0094

Here, crowded into the smallest area, with the Red Army on the other side of the VISTULA attempting to cross again and again and the insurgents at the back of us, my units bled to death. The well placed artillery fire of the enemy from the east of the VISTULA made our situation hell.

Only when all attempts to cross had failed, and also the support of the British Air Fleet did not have the success expected because of the indentation of the front-line (Frontverzahnung), did the Polish leaders of the rising decide to capitulate owing to lack of ammunition and food. The fact too that tens of thousands of women and children refused to leave the city, unless accompanied by their fighting fathers and brothers, added to the readiness to capitulate.

I did not demand an unconditional surrender, nor would the Polish leaders have agreed to one. The negotiations lasted for days. I granted the Poles all the belligerent rights of the Geneva Convention. As the signers of the treaty knew that the bitterness of the fighting had led to excesses on both sides, I expressly allowed an amnesty in the surrender treaty. After the prisoners had been handed over to the competent authorities of the Armed Forces, according to rules, and the civilian population to the civilian administration -whereupon I had copies of the surrender document delivered to all authorities.- I went personally to East Prussia in order to have the recognition of the terms of the surrender expressly confirmed to me. I did not return to WARSAW again. I was given a new commission.

signed: Erich von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI.

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Affidavit

Having been instructed about the consequences of a false affidavit, I declare the following under oath for submission to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg:

I, Wilhelm-Ernst von PALEZIEUX, architect, born 3 Nov 1906 in Weimar, was employed by the General Government from 15 Sept. 1941, and until 31.3.42 on the Construction Board of the Governor General in the BELVEDERE-PALACE in WARSAW, then from 1.4.42 at the Chancellery of the Governor General in CRACOW at the castle.

The art treasures stored in the castle in CRACOW since the Spring of 1943 were under official and legal supervision there. Dr. FRANK always referred to these art treasures to me as state property of the General Government. Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made before my presence in Poland; the list of the first selection had been printed in book form as a catalogue with description and statement of origin; it had been produced by order of the General Governor.

The idea repeatedly expressed by Dr. FRANK was to establish later on a museum in the castle of CRACOW to contain these objects of art. Dr. FRANK attached great importance to preserving the art possessions of the General Government, and increasing them if possible. When, for instance, the possibility arose to return part of the legacy left by CHOPIN, it was not brought to Berlin but to Cracow and placed there in the form of a small exhibition in the State Library by order of Dr. FRANK.

Bad Wiessee / Upper Bavaria, House Agricola, 31 January 1946

signed: Wilhelm-Ernst von PALEZIEUX.

H0660-0095